

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1986

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 2263

STATE PASS ACDA FOR DR. IKLE

FROM US REP MBFR

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: GERMAN VIEWS ON MBFR

REF: BONN 3785

BEGIN SUMMARY: IN DISCUSSION WITH US REP MARCH 12, VISITNG
FRG OFFICIALS ROTH AND RUTH REVEALED CONTINUING GERMAN SENSITIVITY
TO VERIFICATION ISSUES. ALTHOUGH FRG POSITION WAS COUCHED IN
TERMS OF CONCERN WITH POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON NATO SOLIDARITY,
EUROPEAN AND US RELATIONSHIPS, ETC., THE REAL CONCERN IS THE
LONG-STANDING WORRY THAT FRG WILL BE SINGLED OUT FOR ARMS
CONTROL PURPOSES IN WAYS WHICH COULD IMPINGE ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY
AND MIGHT BE THE ONLY NATO COUNTRY TO WHICH VERIFICATION WOULD

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APPLY IN PHASE I. FRG POSITION IS THAT WHILE THERE IS NO QUESTION

ABOUT VERIFICATION BY "NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS" AND THAT WITHDRAWALS COULD BE VERIFIED BY OBSERVERS ANYTHING ELSE, I.E. NEGOTIATED VERIFICATION OF MAINTENANCE OF NEW FORCE LEVELS, MUST BE ANALYZED CAREFULLY IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES (I.E. (FOR FRG) AS AGAINST THE LIMITED MILITARY ADVANTAGES. SOME NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MIGHT BE TOLERABLE; BUT QUESTION SHOULD BE RE-EXAMINED IN NATO -- AD WILL BE RAISED BY ROTH AND RUTH IN WASHINGTON. GERMANS HOPE MORE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF VERIFYING REDUCTIONS AS OPPOSED TO WITHDRAWALS, CAN BE POSTPONED UNTIL NATURE OF POSSIBLE PHASE II AGREEMENT IS MORE CLEAR. END SUMMARY.

1. US REP, DEPREP AND ACDA REP HAD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION ON 12 MARCH AT FRG EMBASSY WITH AMB. BEHREND, AND FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH AND FONOFF MBFR CHIEF RUTH. LATTER WERE VISITING VIENNA FOR CONSULTATIONS ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON FOR TRILATERAL TALKS AND DISCUSSION OF MBFR WITH US OFFICIALS, INCLUDING ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE.

2. ROTH BEGAN WITH A BRIEF MENTION OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, WHICH WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT OPTION III WAS NO LONGER BEING CONSIDERED AS A "SEPARATE OPTION"; US REP SAID THAT WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A NUCLEAR PACKAGE AND ITS COMPONENTS WAS, HOWEVER, STILL UNDER ACTIVE CONSIDERATION FOR POSSIBLE USE AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG THE LINES OF AMB. RUMSFELD'S JULY 26 NAC PRESENTATION. ROTH'S POINT, APPARENTLY, WAS THAT STOCKPILE REDUCTIONS, MISSILE AND AIRCRAFT COMPONENTS WERE REALLY SEPARATE ITEMS, WHICH HE HOPED TO DISCUSS AS SUCH IN WASHINGTON, ESPECIALLY THE AIRCRAFT ASPECTS.

3. MOST OF THE DISCUSSION WAS ON VERIFICATION, ON WHICH FRG OFFICIALS MADE PRESENTATION VERY SIMILAR TO THAT IN REFTEL. ALTHOUGH WHEN PRESSED BY US REPS FOR RATIONALE OF VARIOUS GERMAN SENSITIVITIES, RUTH DREW ON AN INGENIOUS VARIETY OF ARGUMENTS, SUCH AS NATO SOLIDARITY, EUROPEAN-US RELATIONS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, POSSIBLE NEED FOR BUNDESTAG RATIFICATION OF INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS, ETC., IT WAS EVIDENT THAT GERMAN NATIONAL SENSITIVITY AND PERHAPS DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, WERE THE HEART OF THE MATTER.

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4. THE MAIN BURDEN OF ARGUMENT BY ROTH AND RUTH WAS THAT THEY WANTED TO RE-EXAMINE BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AND MILITARY BENEFIT OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION FOR VERIFICATION, ESPECIALLY IN PHASE I, LEAVING PHASE II MEASURES FOR LATER CONSIDERATION WHEN MORE WAS KNOWN ABOUT THE SHAPE OF ANY POSSIBLE AGREEMENT. GERMANS KNEW THEY COULD ACCEPT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM); TEMPORARY OBSERVERS TO OBSERVE

REDUCTIONS WERE ACCEPTABLE AS LONG AS THEY DID NOT TURN INTO A PERMANENT INSTITUTION. WHILE THEY WOULD NOT NOW RULE OUT SOME STATIC OR MOBILE INSPECTION POST TO VERIFY POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, AND POSSIBLY THE IDEA OF INSPECTION BY CHALLENGE, THEY WOULD TRY TO BALANCE THE LIMITED MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND POLITICAL DRAWBACKS OF SPECIFIC INSPECTION MEASURES BEFORE COMMITTING THEMSELVES. US DEPREP NOTED THAT FRG'S THRESHOLD OF TOLERABILITY WAS, IN ANY CASE, LIKELY TO EXCEED WHAT COULD BE NEGOTIATED, IN FACT, WITH THE EAST.

5. ROTH AND RUTH PARTICULARLY STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF RECONSIDERING EXTENSION OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION TO THE WESTERN DISTRICTS OF SOVIET UNION; BUT THEY RECOGNIZED THAT RUSSIAN AGREEMENT WAS UNLIKELY AT BEST. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR CONCERN THAT PHASE I WOULD INVOLVE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND RESIDUAL FORCE LEVELS ONLY ON GERMAN TERRITORY, US REPS

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 2263

STATE PASS ACDA FOR DR. IKLE

FROM US REP MBFR

QUESTIONED LOGIC OF THIS ASSERTION AND COMMENTED THAT EAST WOULD PROBABLY DESIRE SOME INSPECTION OF PORTS AND AIRFIELDS IN THE BENELUX LINE OF COMMUNICATION, E.G. ROTTERDAM. ROTH SAID UK WAS OF COURSE OPPOSED TO ANY INSPECTION THERE.

6. ROTH NOTED THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A "NEW" ACDA INTEREST IN NEGOTIATED INSPECTION, POSSIBLY BECAUSE OF ITS ARMS CONTROL PRECEDENT VALUE. US ACDA REP REPLIES THAT THIS WAS NOT A NEW POLICY, BUT RATHER AN AWARENESS THAT CONSIDERATION OF VERIFYING RESIDUAL FORCES HAD BEEN RELATIVELY NEGLECTED. VERIFICATION, LIKE MBFR ITSELF, SHOULD FOCUS ON RESULTS, NOT JUST WITHDRAWALS, IN THE INTEREST OF A STABLE SECURITY SYSTEM IN WESTERN EUROPE. THIS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AS A SUPPLEMENT TO NTM IN PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS
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BY THE OTHER SIDE TO WESTERN DECISION MAKERS. ALSO, FROM A PUBLIC RELATIONS STANDPOINT, A FOCUS ON VERIFYING RESIDUAL FORCES COULD HELP AVOID OVER-EMPHASIS ON THE WITHDRAWALS THEMSELVES, WHICH MIGHT ADD TO DETENTE EUPHORIA. IN OTHER WORDS, NOT ALL THE POLITICAL ASPECTS APPEARED NEGATIVE, EVEN FROM THE FRG'S STANDPOINT. HE URGED GERMAN OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WITH DR. IKLE IN WASHINGTON.

7. RUTH COMMENTED THAT THE MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS NOW OPERATING IN WEST GERMANY BY FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT HAD NO JURIDICAL STATUS AS FAR AS THE FRG WAS CONCERNED; THE FRG SIMPLY IGNORED THE QUESTION OF THEIR PRESENCE. BUT IF SEMI-PERMANENT MBFR INSPECTORS WERE TO BE STATIONED IN FRG, THIS WOULD REQUIRE BUNDESTAG LEGISLATION WITH EXTENSIVE PUBLIC DEBATE AND HENCE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. DESPITE REPEATED QUESTIONS, ROTH AND RUTH COULD NOT, HOWEVER, GIVE MORE THAN GENERAL EXAMPLES OF HOW THE PRESENCE OF SUCH INSPECTORS WOULD ACTUALLY BE TROUBLESOME.

8. THE DISCUSSION CONCLUDED WITH A GENERAL SUMMARY BY US DEPREP OF PROGRESS OF INFORMAL MBFR MEETINGS TO DATE. HE STRESSED THAT WEST'S EMPHASIS WAS ON GETTING SOVIETS TO POSTPONE EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS UNTIL PHASE II AND ON THE COMMON CEILING. FRG OFFICIALS CONCURRED THAT THIS WAS CORRECT APPROACH AND WERE PARTICULARLY OPPOSED TO SOVIET CONCEPT OF SYMBOLIC EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS AT OUTSET. US REPS INDICATED THAT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS HAD YET BEEN MADE TOWARD OBJECTIVES JUST MENTIONED DESPITE ENCOURAGING PROCEDURAL INNOVATIONS; AND THEY THOUGHT THAT WEST WOULD HAVE TO STICK TO ITS POSITION FOR SOME WEEKS BEFORE ANY SHIFT IN THE EASTERN POSITION WAS LIKELY. HUMES

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